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Abstract Markets can show different types of dynamics,
from quiet markets dominated by one or a few products, to
markets with continual penetration of new and reintroduced
products. In a previous article we explored the dynamics of
markets from a psychological perspective using a multi-agent
simulation model. The main results indicated that the
behavioral rules dominating the artiﬁcial consumer’s
decision making determine the resulting market dynamics,
such as fashions, lock-in, and unstable renewal. Results also
show the importance of psychological variables like social
networks, preferences, and the need for identity to explain
the dynamics of markets. In this article we extend this work
in two directions. First, we will focus on a more systematic
investigation of the effects of different network structures.
The previous article was based on Watts and Strogatz’s
approach, which describes the small-world and clustering
characteristics in networks. More recent research
demonstrated that many large networks display a scale-free
power-law distribution for node connectivity. In terms of
market dynamics this may imply that a small proportion of
consumers may have an exceptional inﬂuence on the
consumptive behavior of others (hubs, or early adapters). We
show that market dynamics is a self-organized property
depending on the interaction between the agents’
decision-making process (heuristics), the product
characteristics (degree of satisfaction of unit of consumption,
visibility), and the structure of interactions between agents
(size of network and hubs in a social network).
1 Introduction
In daily life consumers participate in many different markets. Some markets are stable
and are dominated by one or a few products, such as detergents, milk, clothespins,
litterbags, and many other household products. In such locked-in markets only a
few competing products exist, and new products very rarely enter the market. Other
markets are very unstable, showing large changes in market share and frequent new
product introductions, as in fashion, perfumes, and car models. Here a continual inﬂow
of new products and outﬂow of old ones can be seen. Prices alone cannot explain
the differences in market dynamics. Social processes, such as imitation, conspicuous
consumption, and status seeking, appear to play a decisive role in market dynamics
such as fads and fashions and more moderate social-susceptible markets. The effects
of social processes have for example been acknowledged in stock markets (herding
c© 2003 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Artiﬁcial Life 9: 343–356 (2003)
M. A. Janssen and W. Jager Simulating Market Dynamics
effects; e.g., [5]) and clothing (e.g., [15]). Hence social processes have to be taken into
consideration to explain changing consumption patterns among groups.
Two basic mechanisms are assumed to underlie the social processes that can be wit-
nessed in markets (e.g., [8]). In the ﬁrst mechanism, the product choice of other people
provides a practical heuristic to limit the set of options to choose between. Especially
in conditions of uncertainty, people tend to observe the behavior of others to quickly
ﬁnd out about attractive solutions for a decision problem. In particular, the behavior
of people similar on a relevant dimension (e.g., income) may provide valuable infor-
mation. The more people perform a particular behavior, the more frequently it will be
observed, resulting in a self-reinforcing process propagating the behavior. Both situa-
tional factors (e.g., complex products, unstable markets, visibility of consumption) and
personal characteristics (e.g., uncertainty tolerance, motivation to comply) determine
the extent to which people are inclined to use this type of social information. Theories
and concepts that relate to this type of mechanism are social learning and imitation [2],
social comparison [6], and norms [4].
The second mechanism we distinguish is based on social needs that people have.
People have needs to belong to a group (belongingness) and express their status and
personality (identity) (e.g., [10]). Hence using a certain product may have extra value
because a particular group of people is already using it. For example, one may value
a large yacht partly because of the status attached to it. Here one may focus on
people having higher (ﬁnancial) abilities as sources of interesting opportunities for
consumption. In case of car models, haircuts, and clothing styles such social needs
appear to play an important role in the product choice. The approaches of Veblen [17]
and successors mainly focus on this second mechanism. Whereas the two mechanisms
may operate separately, they often operate combined—for example, a person imitating
the clothing style of others to belong to the group. Essential in both types of social
processes is the size and shape of the social network through which information is
being transferred.
Several scientiﬁc disciplines, such as sociology, social psychology, economics, and
spatial sciences, have focused on networks as a medium through which empirical
phenomena emerge. Especially in the ﬁeld of sociology there exists a rich tradition in
the analysis and formal modeling of social networks. However, whereas large bodies
of literature exist on social processes, social networks, and market dynamics, there
is up till now no research integrating these literatures. There exists no inventory of
the types of social networks that connect consumers in different markets, and how
these different types of connections affect the diffusion process or market dynamics.
Only one empirical study has been found that investigated the relation between social
networks and brand choice [13]. Using graph-theoretic social network techniques,
they found that people in more cohesive groups, indicating stronger links between
the people, more frequently buy the same brands of products, thus suggesting that a
closer social network stimulates homogeneity in consumption. Yet the integration of
these literatures is necessary, because market dynamics are often strongly affected by
social processes. The shape of social networks through which these social processes
commence is hypothesized to be an important determinant of the resulting market
dynamics.
A major barrier for integration of these literatures resides in the difﬁculty of trans-
lating micro-level data from case studies to a macro-level market-dynamical context.
Newly developed computer simulation techniques allow for this translation, and hence
promise synergistic beneﬁts from combining too anecdotal case studies with too ab-
stract computer simulations. In earlier work using a simulation model [9] we explored
how different network types affect the dynamics in different types of markets. The
social network was formalized as a Watts-Strogatz [18] network, which is represented
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as a circle of agents where each agent has contact with some of the neighbours (local
contacts) and with a number of random other agents. Using this formalization, we
found that if social processes dominate a market, an increase in the size of the net-
work causes the market to be dominated by a few products. However, whereas this
work illustrated the importance of social processes and network effects in the context
of market dynamics, the results were too abstract to be useful in a practical context.
A main objection is that many networks in consumer markets do not conform to the
Watts-Strogatz structure. For example, small networks with dense contacts (household,
family friends) may exist within a structure with more distant contacts. Moreover, some
people have more contacts and inﬂuence other people’s behavior more than others.
Hence our research objectives are (1) to identify the shapes of consumer networks for
different product markets, and (2) to explore how these network shapes affect market
dynamics.
We hypothesize that people participate in different networks for different markets.
The size of these networks may differ as a function of the social needs and/or social
heuristics involved in a product choice. For example, whereas you may be well aware
of the brand and type of car your friends are driving, the chance that you know which
brand of milk they drink or in what type of refrigerator they store that milk is much
lower. For different products one may also address different people in one’s network.
For example, one may talk with some people about cars, and other people about
music. Also, some people may have a far larger network than other people, which
affects the shape of the network. Again, this may be related to products; for example,
a car salesman may have a large number of links related to cars, but only a few related
to music. Hence it may be expected that for some products people may have about
an equal number of links to other people, and that in other markets some people
function as hubs, being central in a network and having a disproportional inﬂuence on
the consumptive behavior of others. Rogers [14] found that especially early adopters
are people with a lot of links and a high status in the social network. People in the
center of a network may have higher status because of the number of connections, and
this status may have a counterpart in how other people value such people’s product
consumption [16].
2 The Model
Consider a population of N agents where each period the agents make a choice which
of the M products to consume. The agents are connected with, on average, k other
agents. We call these connected agents friends. Products are assumed to differ from
each other in a dimension d , which is deﬁned for a range from 0 to 1.
2.1 The Utility of Products
The utility of using a product consists of an individual part and a social effect part. The
individual part expresses the difference between personal preferences of a consumer
for each product and the product dimension. The preference for product i, pi , is
expressed by a value between 0 and 1. The utility for the product, based on personal
preferences alone, is equal to one minus the absolute difference between personal
preference pi and product dimension di .
The social effect means that the utility of a product increases when more friends
consume the same product. This effect only affects the social need satisfaction. Hence,
this effect qualitatively differs from the positive network effect often discussed in con-
nection with markets such as software or faxes, in that here the individual utility is
not affected by the number of friends consuming the same product. This social effect
relates to the second mechanism as discussed in the introductory setting, and involves
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Veblen effects [17] and bandwagons [7]. The variable xj denotes therefore the fraction
of the friends of i who consume product j .
The total expected utility of consuming product j is equal to
E [Uij ] = βi · (1 − |dj − pi |) + (1 − βi) · xj (1)
The components of the utility function—the individual part and the social part—are
weighted with βi and 1−βi . A high βi means that the personal need is weighted more,
as is usually the case with more innovative people [12], whereas a low βi means that the
social needs are weighted more, as is usually the case with less innovative people. We
do not include prices explicitly in the model. The dimension dj on which the agents
make decisions can include price-related information.
Heterogeneity in the utility function of the agents is thus introduced at two levels.
First, it pertains to individual variations considering personal preferences regarding the
product characteristics (the value of pi). Second, it resides in different weights of the
personal need against the social need (the value of βi).
2.2 Cognitive Processing
In deciding what product to consume, the agent may employ different cognitive pro-
cesses. The type of processing the agent engages in depends on the level of need
satisfaction and on the experienced uncertainty.
The need satisfaction of an agent is expressed as E [Uij ]; it reﬂects the total expected
utility (individual and network) an agent i obtains when consuming product j .
The expected uncertainty E [Uncij ] reﬂects how uncertain an agent i is about having
made the best choice when choosing product j . The more friends in their social
network consume other products, the more uncertain an agent is. Furthermore, the
value of βi determines how sensitive an agent is to not having the same choice as his
or her friends. The more important the social need (the lower the value of βi), the
more uncertain an agent becomes when his or her friends consume different products:
E [Uncij ] = (1 − β)(1 − xj ) (2)
with 1 − xj the fraction of the friends of agent i who consume a different product
than agent i. It is essential that agents start engaging in social processing when their
uncertainty exceeds a critical level, which is related to the ﬁrst mechanism as discussed
in the introductory section (imitation, social comparison).
The agents may engage in different cognitive processes in deciding how to behave,
depending on their level of need satisfaction (individual and social) and degree of
uncertainty. Agents having a low level of need satisfaction and a high degree of un-
certainty are assumed to socially compare. This implies comparing one’s own previous
behavior with the previous behavior of agents having similar abilities, and selecting
the behavior that yields a maximal level of need satisfaction. When agents have a
high level of need satisfaction but also a high level of uncertainty, they will imitate the
behavior of other sufﬁciently similar agents. Agents having a low level of need satis-
faction and a low degree of uncertainty are assumed to deliberate, that is, to determine
the consequences of all possible decisions, within a ﬁxed time horizon, in order to
maximize the level of need satisfaction. Finally, agents having high need satisfaction
and low uncertainty habitually repeat their previous behavior.
The threshold parameters Umin, the minimum level for satisfaction, and UncT, the
uncertainty tolerance level, are given for each agent. Given the values of Ui and Unci ,
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the type of cognitive processing of the agent can be deﬁned. When a decision is
made and the product is consumed, and all other agents have made their decisions and
consumed their product of choice, we can calculate the actual utility of consumption
Ui and level of uncertainty Unci . Note that E [Uij ] differs from Ui in that E [Uij ] refers
to the expected utility of agent i consuming product j , whereas Ui is the experienced
utility of consuming product i. The same holds for E [Uncij ] and Unci . The following
four types of cognitive processes are being formalized:
• Repetition (satisﬁed and certain: Ui ≥ Umin; Unci ≤ UncT). The agent continues
to (habitually) consume the product that has been consumed in the previous time
step.
• Deliberation (dissatisﬁed and certain: Ui < Umin; Unci ≤ UncT). The agent will
evaluate the expected Ui of each product, and will use a logit function to solve the
discrete choice problem in Equation 2. A logit function is a common mathematical
model to address discrete choice problems. In discrete choice problems individuals
has to make a decision between different options, depending on certain variables.
In our case, the options are the different products, and the variable is the expected
utility. In the logit function the products acquire a probability j of being chosen.
This probability depends on the relative expected utility. For the expectation we
assume that the agents have perfect information on the product characteristics
(values of di) and use the information on the consumptive behavior of the other
agents in the network as observed in the previous period (the observed value of
xi). The products are weighted by the exponent of the parameter b1 times the
expected utility. The higher the value of b1, the more sensitive is the decision
between the products to differences in their expected utility. The resulting







• Imitation (satisﬁed and uncertain: Ui ≥ Umin; Unci > UncT). The agent evaluates
the products that are being consumed by his or her friends. The product with the
largest share among the neighbors has a higher probability of being chosen for
current consumption. Here too, we use a logit function to describe the discrete
choice. But instead of estimating the expected utility, the imitating agent weights








Like the parameter b1 in Equation 3, the parameter b2 refers to the sensitivity of the
agents in making a decision. Here they are more or less sensitive to differences in
the relative consumption of the products by their neighbors.
• Social comparison (dissatisﬁed and uncertain: Ui < Umin; Unci > UncT). The
agent evaluates the products that are consumed by his or her friends. Using the
same logit function as in the case of deliberation, the agent makes a choice
between the expected satisfaction resulting from consuming the products that are
also consumed by their friends. Thus the socially comparing agent might consider
a smaller set of products than a deliberating agent.
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2.3 Product Characteristics
The product characteristics are characterized by their potential to satisfy the agents and
their visibility. To vary products’ ability to satisfy, the utility function of Equation 1
is weighted by a value α reﬂecting the degree to which a type of product ultimately
can satisfy an agent. Consumers are not easily satisﬁed with products having a low α
and spend more time reasoning about their decision in markets characterized by such
products:
Uij = α · [βi · (1 − |dj − pi |) + (1 − βi) · xj ]. (5)
The visibility of products is addressed as follows. An agent is linked to a number
of other agents, which we call friends. For products of normal (medium) visibility the
agent will look at this network of friends to determine the social utility. For less visible
products the agent will only look at those agents having similar preferences (values
of pi), which we call close friends. Here the agent will use a subset of its network
of friends. On the other hand, highly visible products may generate social processes
among agents who are not even friends. Here information is also obtained from friends
of friends; thus a meta-network is being used that consists of the summed networks of
all friends. Thus, assuming products with low, medium, and high visibility, we will use
different variations of the social network to simulate information exchange.
3 Social Networks
An important aspect of our analysis of the model is to assess the consequences of
different structures of social networks on the choices agents make. During the last
few years physicists have developed a number of mathematical models that describe
the characteristics of networks found in empirical studies. We will use these different
network formulations in our experiments, but ﬁrst we discuss brieﬂy the different types
of networks.
Watts and Strogatz [18] proposed a model for social networks that describes the
small-world and clustering characteristics in networks. This model includes empirically
found characteristics of social networks, namely the small-world effect [11] and the
clustering effect [12]. The small-world effect refers to the experience that despite the
large population, the map of who knows whom is such that we are all very closely
connected to one another. The clustering characteristic refers to the existence of clusters
in social networks. People’s circles of acquaintance tend to overlap to a great extent.
Your friend’s friends are likely also to be your friends.
The model of Watts and Strogatz consist of a regular lattice that has some degree
of randomness in it (Figure 1). They construct the network by taking a lattice with
periodic boundary conditions, going through each of its links, and with some probability
s rewiring that link by moving one of its ends to a new, randomly chosen position.
When s is equal to zero, the network is a regular grid; when s is equal to 1, it is a
random network.
In recent years large networks, such as the Internet and scientiﬁc collaborations,
have been analyzed, and a common property of many large networks is that the node
connectivities follow a scale-free power-law distribution [3]. It can be hypothesized that
such a distribution of connectivities also describes consumer networks. For example,
Rogers [14] states that early adopters are typically people having many contacts and
a good reputation. Hence they can be understood as hubs in a consumer network.
Barabasi and Albert [3] formulated a model that can reproduce these characteristics.
The idea is that a network grows over time by adding new nodes. These new nodes
have a preference to be connected to other nodes that are already well connected. For
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Figure 1. A Watts-Strogatz network.
Figure 2. An example of a scale-free network.
example, if you create a new web page, you are more likely to create links with already
well-connected web pages. An example of such a scale-free network is depicted in
Figure 2, where it can be seen that most nodes have two or three links, but two nodes
have six and eight links, thus having more inﬂuence in the network.
Amaral et al. [1] showed that the scale-free network hypothesis is more complex.
They analyzed different types of networks and found also networks that followed the
power law up to a sharp cutoff. For example, a highly connected node may refuse to
accept new connections because of capacity and cost constraints, or a well-connected
node may die. Amaral et al. [1] proposed an adjustment of the Barabasi-Albert model
by including the option that a node in the network becomes inactive with a certain
probability. Since new nodes can only connect with active nodes, they are able to
reproduce different classes of observed networks. This approach may be more correct
in modeling consumer networks, as consumers functioning as a hub in a network will
be limited in the number of contacts they have.
4 Experiments
Consider a market of N (=1000) agents and M (=10) products. The agents have on
average 10 friends. The preference for a product p, as well as the value of β, is
drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. The threshold Umin and UncT also
vary among the population of agents. The values of Umin are drawn from a uniform
distribution between zero and one, and the values of UncT are drawn from a uniform
distribution between zero and one-half. This means that, given an average value of βi
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of 0.5 in the population, the average agent becomes uncertain when more than half of
his or her friends consume a different product. Simulations last 100 time steps, and all
agents have to make a decision during each time step. The values of b1 and b2 are 2/α
and 4. The factor 2/α is used to maintain correct scaling of the skewness for different
values of α (Equation 5) in the various experiments.
The performance of agents during the simulations is captured in two aggregated
indicators. The ﬁrst indicator measures dominance of products on the market. The
higher this indicator, the more the market is dominated by one or a few products. A
value of zero means that all products have an equal market share. The dominance
indicator is calculated as the average Gini coefﬁcient for the last 10 time steps. The










where yi is the number of agents choosing product i.
The other aggregated indicator is the turbulence, which is the average change of
product choice during the simulation by all agents. Thus turbulence 1.0 means that all
agents change their choice each period, and 0.0 means that no agent changes its choice
after its initial choice.
4.1 Experimental Design
We performed a series of experiments. First, for a given network we vary the de-
gree of visibility (low, medium, or high) and the satisfaction per unit of consumption
(α = 0.125, 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 4, 8). Furthermore, we test a number of different networks.
We denote variations of the small-world network by SW (s), where s is the probability
of random links; thus we have a random network for s equal to one, and a regular
lattice for s equal to zero. The variations of the scale-free network are denoted by
SF (d), where d is the probability of a node becoming inactive when a new node is
added. When d = 0 the model describes the network of Barabasi & Albert [3]; when
d = 0.01, that of Amaral et al. [1]. Hence we tested the experimental design shown in
Table 1. For each cell in the design ﬁve types of networks were tested:
• SW (s = 0)—Small world without random contacts.
• SW (s = 0.1)—Small world with 10% random contacts.
• SW (s = 1)—Small world with 100% random contacts, implying a fully random
network.
• SF (d = 0)—Scale-free network.
• SF (d = 0.01)—Scale-free network with limited links.
Five network formalizations per cell yield a total of 5 × 21 = 105 conditions. Running
10 simulations for each condition yields a total of 1050 experimental runs.
4.2 Results
For all the experiments we derive a similar pattern of the distribution of cognitive
processes. Figure 3 shows the condition of low visibility of products in a scale-free
network SF (d = 0). Product markets typiﬁed by products providing a high level of
satisfaction (high α) lead to more automatic cognitive processing such as repetition
and imitation. When products provide a low level of satisfaction (α is low), the main
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Table 1. The experimental design.
Satisfaction per unit consumption (α)




Figure 3. Share of cognitive processes for different levels of satisfaction per unit consumption (α) for SF(d = 0) and
low visibility.
cognitive process is social comparison. This explains the turbulence trends as depicted
in Figure 4. When the satisfaction per unit of consumption (α) is low, agents are
not easily satisﬁed, performing deliberation and social comparison, and by doing this
frequently change their choice. At higher levels of satisfaction per unit of consumption,
satisfaction increases and therefore agents more frequently repeat their product choice.
An interesting difference between the different levels of visibility is that high visibility
leads to lower turbulence. The reason is that agents get information from a larger group
of agents, which has a stabilizing effect on the choices made.
Figure 4. Level of turbulence for different levels of satisfaction per unit consumption for SF(d = 0) and high, medium,
and low visibility conditions.
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Figure 5. Turbulence for different levels of satisfaction per unit consumption, for agents with a high and a low value
of β . The degree of visibility was also varied.
The level of turbulence is not the same for all type of agents. Figure 5 shows the
turbulence development for agents that attach a very high weight to their social need
(low value of β) and for agents that attach a very high weight to their individual need
(high value of β). Agents focusing on their social need remain at a high level of
turbulence, even when the level of satisfaction per unit consumption increases. One of
the reasons is the higher uncertainty of these agents as deﬁned in Equation 2. Another
reason is that the social susceptibility of these agents causes them to change their
behavior very easily when friends change their behavior. This may cause cascades of
change in the system, yielding in a high turbulence. Agents with a high value of β
mainly take into account their personal preferences. When their satisfaction per unit of
consumption (α) is low, they may deliberate and try out different products, but when
their satisfaction per unit of consumption is higher they will ﬁnd a product that satisﬁes
them, and they will repeat the choice from then on.
The indicator values of turbulence are very similar for the different types of networks.
This is quite different for the indicator values of dominance, as we will discuss below.
In Figure 6 we depict the dominance of products for different conditions. It can
be seen that product dominance varies as a function of the satisfaction per unit of
consumption, the visibility, and the type of social network.
First, the higher the satisfaction per unit of consumption (higher value of α) leads
to a higher level of dominance. The higher satisfaction stimulates more automatic
processing, and hence the agents engage more frequently in imitation. This causes
them to choose the same product.
Second, higher visibility of the product leads to a higher level of dominance. This is
not surprising, since imitators copy the majority choice of a larger population. When
one can only imitate from a small number of others, there is a larger chance that small
groups emerge consuming the same product (local lock-in). High visibility enlarges
the chance that very large groups or all consumers start consuming the same product
(total lock-in).
Third, the structure of the social network has an effect on the dominance. A regular
lattice in a small world [SW (s = 0)] will never have a high degree of dominance,
since clusters of similar choices will be local. The structure of the network reduces
the spread of information. The higher the probability of random nodes gets, the more
social processes will spread a product choice over the population, and hence the more a
single product will dominate the market. Figure 7 depicts this relation for high-visibility
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Figure 6. Dominance of different levels of satisfaction per unit consumption, for different types of networks. The
top graph represents low visibility, the middle graph medium visibility, and the bottom graph high visibility.
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Figure 7. Dominance for different values of s, the probability of random links in a small-world network.
products. Random networks SW (s = 1) even have fairly high values of dominance for
low- and medium-visibility products.
However, the level of dominance is in most cases higher for scale-free networks.
The hubs cause a fast spread of information, even when the visibility is low. The role
of a central node (hub) in a network is very important, because hubs will inﬂuence a
lot of other agents, and this leads to a more homogeneous choice. Moreover, they may
observe very quickly if another agent uses an attractive product. Hence a hub may
have easy access to the efforts of many other agents in ﬁnding good opportunities for
consumption. Of course, people are limited as regards the number of links they can
have. However, the simulation results demonstrate that the dominance levels reduce a
bit in the limited links condition [SF (d = 0.01)], but the results do not differ a lot from
the full scale-free condition [SF (d = 0)].
5 Discussion and Conclusion
The results presented in this article indicate that besides psychological needs and deci-
sion processes, also the size and shape of the network involved in consumer decision
making have an important inﬂuence on how the market organizes itself. Especially
when the satisfaction per unit of consumption is high, as is often the case with prod-
ucts that satisfy lower needs, the results suggest that the shape of the network has
serious consequences for the number of products that dominate the market. The re-
sults show that a scale-free network yields a market dominated by far fewer products
than in the small-world network with a limited number of random links. Even for low-
visibility products the hubs have a strong inﬂuence on which products other agents
consume. Limiting the acceptance of new contacts by these hubs hardly weakens this
effect. Hence the simulation results suggest that people with a lot of contacts have
a very large effect on other people’s consumption. These results are in concordance
with Rogers’ [14] observation that the early adopters are people with a lot of links and
a high status in the social network. Using the network, the hub may be very quickly
aware of new, attractive opportunities for consumption, and by adopting them himself
he serves as a role model for all the others that are linked to him.
A central question that emerges is how networks affect real-life consumer decisions.
It can be assumed that in certain markets the role of a network is virtually absent
(for example, when buying milk), but that in other markets people rely heavily on
information that is communicated through a network. Here the size and shape of
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a network may depend on the type of product involved. For example, when the
consumption involves status-relevant products, people may focus on a subset of people
in their network who have a higher social status. When the consumption involves the
buying of a new computer, one may acquire information from people in the network
who have the most experience with computers, independent of their status. And when
it concerns the buying of clothing one may compare oneself with others in the network
who have about the same opinions as oneself. In some cases the number of other
users in the social network may be small, as with computers. On the other hand, one
may look at many other people in one’s network—for example, to determine what is
fashionable.
In empirical research we are planning to identify the shapes of consumer networks
for different product markets, and estimate how these network shapes affect market
dynamics. The empirical data at the micro level will be used in further reﬁning the
simulation model. The experimental outcomes in terms of dynamical processes will
be tested against macro-level empirical data from different product markets. Here we
want to use time series of product market shares for different brands. The selected
product markets will differ on the social importance of products, the types of needs
that are involved in these markets (for example, “lower” subsistence needs vs. “higher”
social needs) and the degree to which people are satisﬁed with products.
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